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Indonesia changed its development strategy from an inward-looking import substitution to 
an outward-looking export orientation in the mid 1980s. Deregulation measures introduced 
during this period have made the Indonesian economy become more integrated with the 
world economy. This study examines the impact of a more globally integrated Indonesian 
economy on its labor market. The findings indicate that increasing economic openness is 
associated with growing outputs, which has resulted in an expansion of employment and 
growing real wages of both skilled and unskilled workers. Employment of skilled workers, 
however, has grown faster than that of unskilled workers. On the other hand, unskilled 
wages have grown faster than skilled wages, resulting in declining w age inequality. This is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. 
However, this pattern of change in relative employment and wages is also consistent with 
the prevailing long-term trend of a growing relative supply of skilled workers. 
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I.  Introduction 
Increasing international economic integration has been accused as being the cause 
of the plight of unskilled labor in both developed and developing countries.1 It is argued 
that, as a result of trade liberalization,  cheaply produced unskilled labor-intensive goods 
from developing countries flood the developed country markets. This directly suppresses 
the production of similar but more expensive goods produced in developed countries, 
which then causes a reduction in the demand for the services of unskilled workers in these 
countries. As a result, unskilled labor in developed countries suffer from decreasing real 
wages and increasing unemployment. Furthermore, to exploit their comparative advantage, 
developed countries h ave to turn to specializing in the production of skilled labor-intensive 
goods. This increases the demand for skilled labor, which is translated into higher wages 
for them, in turn widening the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
2  
Meanwhile, in developing countries, it is argued that the need for foreign exchange 
earnings from exports has led to increasing exploitation of workers in the forms of low 
wages and poor working conditions in order to produce cheap goods for exports. Hence, 
increasing international economic integration has been accused of exacerbating inequality 
and worsening the lot of the poor by eroding their incomes, increasing their vulnerability, 
and adding to their disempowerment.
3 Multinational corporations, which have c ome to 
invest in the export sectors in developing countries, have been accused of exacerbating the 
situation by profiting handsomely from the exploitation of cheap workers in these 
countries.  
These are controversial arguments for which counter arguments h ave been put 
forward. For the case of developed countries, one alternative factor which has been 
prominently singled out as a more probable reason for falling relative demand for unskilled 
labor is technological change. In particular, the advent of computer technology has shifted 
the demand for skilled labor up while simultaneously reducing the demand for unskilled 
labor in all sectors. Because of these shifts in demand, both relative employment and 
relative wages of skilled labor increase, while those of unskilled labor decrease.
4  
Meanwhile, for the case of developing countries, it is often argued that low wages 
and poor working conditions are not caused by but have existed in spite of international 
economic integration. Many developing countries are plagued by the problems of having a 
large supply of poor and unskilled workers on the one hand and lack of employment 
opportunities in the modern sector on the other. Hence, growth in the export sector caused 
by the opening up of the economy and investment by m ultinational corporations will lead 
to improvements in economic efficiency as workers are reallocated from the lower 
productivity traditional sector to the higher productivity export sector.5  
While this issue is a well-researched subject in the developed  countries context, 
research on this area in the context of developing countries is still rare (Diwan and Walton, 
                                                   
1 International economic integration is one facet of globalization. Simply defined, globalization is the 
growing integration of economies and societies in the world, facilitated by the flow of information, ideas, 
activities, technologies, goods, services, capital, and people. Dollar and Kraay (2000) compiles arguments 
pro and against globalization. 
2 See, for example, Leamer (1994), Sachs and Shatz (1994), and Wood (1994, 1995). 
3 World Bank (2000a) argues that although such a view may not be universal, it does play a role in the public 
perception that cannot be ignored. 
4 Arguments of this line have been put forward, for example, by  Berman  et al. (1994), Krugman and 
Lawrence (1994), and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). 
5 See, for example, Pissarides (1997). For the case of Indonesia, see Manning (1995).  2
1997; Harrison and Hanson, 1999). Early empirical works on this subject show mixed 
results on the labor market outcomes of opening up the economies of developing 
countries.6 Wood (1997), for example, finds that although trade liberalization in the East 
Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s caused reduced wage equality between skilled 
and unskilled labor, the experience of the Latin American  countries in the 1980s and early 
1990s offers contradictory evidence. He argues that the latter is attributed to the entry of 
large low-income countries such as China and India into world markets for manufacture 
starting in the late 1970s, which in effect  substantially increased the world’s supply of 
unskilled labor.  
For the case of Indonesia, Suryahadi  et al. (1999) analyzed the impact of economic 
deregulation since the mid 1980s in the manufacturing sector using data from an 
establishment survey. The results indicate that, immediately after the deregulation, 
unskilled labor relative employment tended to increase but their relative wages tended to 
decrease. The opening up of the economy has an expanding effect in the manufacturing 
sector, increasing the demand for both unskilled and skilled labor. However, since the 
supply of unskilled labor is much more elastic than that of skilled labor, the gain for 
unskilled labor has been more significant in terms of employment than wages.  
Meanwhile, Suryahadi (1999), using labor survey data, finds that the long-term 
trend in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the manufacturing sector 
has been decreasing. He confirms the finding of Suryahadi  et al. (1999) that the short-term 
effect of opening up the economy in the mid 1980s has temporarily reversed this trend in 
this sector. He finds that the long-term declining trend in wage inequality was driven by a 
continuing increase in the relative supply of skilled labor, which was a result of expansion 
in the education sector.  
Building up on the works of Suryahadi (1999) and Suryahadi  et al. (1999), this 
study analyzes the impact of international economic integration on the Indonesian labor 
market. Different from the two earlier studies, the analysis in this study is not limited to the 
manufacturing sector only. In an economy with mobile labor, this issue is clearly general 
equilibrium in nature. Hence, it is important to assess what happened in the whole labor 
market, not only in the sector that is being subjected to more openness or in the tradeable 
sector.  
Assessing the impact of international economic integration on the Indonesian 
economy is made more problematic by the occurrence of an economic crisis starting in mid 
1997. It is a valid argument to say that the economic crisis itself had much to do with 
international economic integration. On the other hand, one can also argue that the 
economic crisis was neither a necessary nor unavoidable impact of international economic 
integration. In particular, one can argue that it is financial integration, which makes 
developing economies more vulnerable to economic crises.
7 It is, of course, almost 
impossible to establish the counterfactual of what would have happened if Indonesia had 
had only an open current account and a closed capital account.  
This is a controversial argument and is not the focus of this study. Hence, it will not 
be discussed further here. This study focuses on the labor market effects of economic 
liberalization in Indonesia starting in the mid 1 980s. The remaining of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section two discusses the data used in this study. Section three 
                                                   
6 These include, but not limited to, González and McKinley (1997), Pissarides (1997), Robbins (1996a and 
1996b), Tan and Batra (1997), Wood (1997). 
7 There is a convergence of arguments that the cause of Indonesian  ￿ as well as other East Asian countries 
￿ economic crisis was a cocktail of open capital account, weak financial institutions, and bad governance.  3
discusses trade and investment liberalization that have taken place in Indonesia since the 
mid 1980s. Section four elaborates on labor market institutions in Indonesia. Section five 
describes the structure of Indonesian labor market. Section six analyzes the changes that 
have taken place in the Indonesian labor market since the trade and investment 
liberalization. Finally, section seven provides the conclusions and policy implications.  
 
II.  Data 
The data analyzed in this study are from the National Labor Force Surveys 
(Sakernas) collected by Statistics Indonesia (BPS). In particular, the analysis here is based 
on the 1986, 1989, 1992,  1994, and 1996-99 surveys. Sakernas is a nationally 
representative repeated cross-section survey that covers approximately 65,000 households 
or 250,000 individuals each year from all provinces of Indonesia. Each year, the survey is 
conducted in the month of August. 
The survey collects information on individual earnings and hours of work on the 
primary job, as well as data on individual characteristics such as gender, age, and 
education level. Hourly wage is constructed by first transforming the information  on 
monthly earnings collected in the survey into weekly earnings (by dividing by 30/7) and 
then by dividing the results by the number of hours worked per week. To make nominal 
wages comparable across years, nominal wages are deflated by the national Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) for the month of August in each year.
8  
 
III.  Trade and Investment Reform 
From the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, Indonesia adopted an inward-looking 
import-substitution development strategy. During that period, awash with revenue from o il 
exports, the government was eager to build capital-intensive industries to replace imports. 
In addition, the government spent a large sum of money in building infrastructure, in 
particular to support agricultural development. Not surprisingly, the role  of the public 
sector in the economy and its growth was dominant during this period. Aswicahyono  et al. 
(1996) argue that this policy was resulted from tremendous internal pressure on the 
government to embark on a more interventionist path, especially in the area of industrial 
policy.  
However, starting in the mid 1980s the Indonesian economy was made more open. 
This was an indirect result of the large drop in oil prices that began in the early 1980s (Hill, 
1996). Because the oil revenue shrank quickly, the  government faced a sudden external 
imbalance. The import substitution strategy had left the Indonesian industries inefficient 
and unable to compete in the world market at the maintained exchange rate. A combination 
of this factor and a general decline in p rimary commodity prices raised the premium on 
foreign exchange. Hence, starting in 1986, the import substitution strategy was discarded 
and replaced with export orientation, followed by a devaluation of the exchange rate and 
combined with deregulation measures in the domestic economy. 
The economic deregulation began in 1986 with a liberalization of export-import 
procedures.9 Since then, various deregulation measures were introduced in order to make 
the economy more efficient. Despite some backward steps, all in all, the government was 
considered successful in its efforts to increase the efficiency of its industries and improve 
their international competitiveness (Fane, 1996). As a result, by the late 1980s, Indonesia 
                                                   
8 It is important to note that the CPI is based on urban prices only. 
9 Earlier, in 1983, the government had started deregulating the banking sector by allowing banks to set their 
own interest rates. In the same year, the government also devalued the exchange rate.  4
appeared at last to be following the East Asian pattern of rapid growth in labor-intensive 
manufactured exports (Hill, 1991). Table 1 shows changes in real effective rate of 
protection and coverage of non-tariff barriers in 1987 and 1995 calculated by Fane and 
Condon (1996). 
 
Table 1. Real Effective Rate of Protection and Non-Tariff Barriers Coverage in Indonesia, 
1987 and 1995 
  Real Effective Rate of 
Protection (%) 
Non-Tariff Barriers Coverage 
of Value Added (%) 
Sector  1987  1995  1987  1995 
Agriculture  10  4  64  46 
- Food crops  11  6  77  57 
- Estate & other crops  0  -6  73  33 
- Livestock  17  7  25  3 
- Forestry  -30  -56  -  72 
- Fishing & hunting  1  18  17  0 
         
Mining & quarrying  -13  -6  2  0 
- Oil & gas extraction  -13  -7  0  0 
- Other mining  -12  -4  28  0 
         
Manufacturing  27  -5  53  14 
- Food, beverages, & tobacco  106  21  85  25 
- Textile, clothing, & footwear  78  -9  79  0 
- Wood products  10  27  74  58 
- Paper products  15  2  72  37 
- Chemicals  44  -7  77  0 
- Oil and gas refining  -13  -4  0  0 
- Non-metal products  38  15  59  0 
- Basic metals  -1  -4  59  0 
- Engineering  121  86  87  0 
- Other manufacturing  95  12  34  0 
         
All tradeable sectors  4  0  44  23 
Source:  Fane and Condon (1996) 
 
Table 1 shows that the manufacturing sector experienced the largest drop in 
protection, both in terms of real effective rate of p rotection, as well as, non-tariff barriers 
coverage. For the whole manufacturing sector, the real effective rate of protection fell from 
27 percent in 1987 to a negative protection of 5 percent in 1995, while non-tariff barriers 
coverage of value added fell from 53 to 14 percent during the same period. The agriculture 
sector as a whole also experienced a decrease in protection, where during the same period 
real effective rate of protection fell from 10 to 4 percent and non-tariff barriers coverage of 
value  added fell from 64 to 46 percent. Meanwhile, although the mining and quarrying 
sector experienced an increase in real effective rate of protection, the level of protection for 
this sector remained negative and the few non-tariff barriers that existed were  removed 
during the period. 
The trade liberalization measures and investment reforms were aimed primarily at 
shifting the economy towards a more export oriented structure based on non-oil exports.  5
By all accounts these reforms were quite effective. The growth rate in real annual GDP, 
without the benefit of oil revenues, averaged 6.5 percent between 1987 and 1993, 
approaching that of the rapid growth during the oil boom period of 1971-81. Non-oil 
exports increased substantially during the period, accounting f or 74 percent of total 
exports. The manufacturing sector (including oil and gas manufacturing) led the economy 
by accounting for almost 30 percent of the GDP growth. Its GDP share grew steadily and 
reached 21 percent in 1991 and thus for the first time surpassing the GDP share of 
agriculture.  
  Simultaneously with trade liberalization, Indonesia also liberalized its foreign 
investment policy. The pattern of foreign investment in Indonesia after the liberalization in 
the mid 1980s is reviewed by Thee (1991). He finds that there was a surge in foreign 
investment after the mid 1980s, which mostly came from the four Newly Industrializing 
Countries (NICs): Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. The majority of this 
new foreign investment was export oriented and it occurred mainly in sectors in which 
Indonesia has strong comparative advantage, such as labor and resource intensive 
activities. This contrasts starkly with foreign investment in the previous period, which had 
strong domestic orientation and took place mainly in capital and technology intensive 
sectors. Thee (1991) also points out that the average size of the new foreign investments 
after the mid 1980s is much smaller than investments in the previous period. 
 
IV.  Labor Market Institutions 
The development of Indonesia’s labor market, however, is quite different from that 
of its goods and financial markets. Until the early 1990s, the Indonesian labor market was 
relatively free from distortions. The government did not intervene in wage determination, 
nor did it enforce regulations on laying off workers. Along with that, the government 
tightly controlled the union movement by allowing only one government sanctioned labor 
union. Therefore, as noted by Manning (1994), there has been little effective direct 
government or union involvement in wage setting. In fact, this free labor market is 
considered one of the contributing factors to Indonesia's high economic growth during the 
pre-crisis period.10 
The early 1990s, however, witnessed significant changes in  the Indonesian labor 
market. Among them, three are most important. First, the government revoked the 
regulation, which banned strikes. Second, the government started to enforce the 
implementation of regional minimum wage regulations, which were updated annually. 
Third, some independent labor unions were established despite the government's efforts to 
disband and declare them illegal. These changes were in response to both internal and 
external pressures. The internal pressures came from the rising number of people who were 
concerned with the fate of laborers in the increasingly industrialized Indonesian economy. 
This includes growing concern among senior policy makers that somehow labor has not 
shared in the high growth that has taken place in the economy (Agrawal, 1996; Edwards, 
1996; Manning, 1994). 
The external pressures, meanwhile, were originated from increasing exports from 
Indonesia to North America and the European Union (EU), where concern had risen about 
labor market conditions in exporting developing countries. The focus was on workers in 
export sectors, who, it was claimed, had poor working conditions, low wages, and the 
denial of their fundamental right to form labor union. This belief has led to calls for a 
‘social clause’ in developed-developing countries’ trade arrangements, stipulating that 
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favored access to developed country markets would not be granted to countries where 
labor standards are unsatisfactory (Addison and Demery, 1988). 
Minimum wages were an important plank of government policy i n the labor market 
in the early 1990s. In a period of just five years, the government almost doubled the 
minimum wages in real terms. However, employees in many small and medium enterprises 
remained largely unprotected. This is in addition to a large number of excluded casual 
employment workers, which predominated in agriculture and construction sectors. Hence, 
the implementation of regulations on minimum wages did not reach the majority of 
workers (Manning, 2000; Rama, 2000). 
The economic crisis in Indonesia, which started in mid 1997, has unleashed 
unprecedented changes in the labor market. In May 1998 the crisis led to the fall of an 
authoritarian government, which had been in power for more than three decades. The 
successive transitional government  ￿ which was led by a protégé of the previous president 
and in power only for 17 months until October 1999  ￿ was under constant pressure to 
reverse the authoritarian policy of its predecessor, facilitate the democratization process by 
opening up the decision making process, and improve Indonesia’s bad records on human 
rights, including labor rights.  
Eager to show that the transitional government is not just a continuation of the 
previous government, in less than one month after gaining power the then new government 
ratified the ILO convention no. 87 on “Freedom of Association and the Protection of the 
Right to Organize” in June 1998. A year later, in May 1999, the government ratified three 
more conventions at once, i.e. convention no. 105 on “Abolition of Forced 
convention no. 111 on “Discrimination in Employment and Occupation”, and convention 
no. 138 on “Minimum Age”. With this, as shown in Table 2, Indonesia has ratified all the 
core ILO conventions (Islam, 2000). 
 
Table 2.  Ratification of Core ILO Conventions in ASEAN-5 by 1999 
ILO Convention  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippine  Thailand  Singapore 
No. 29 on Forced Labor  Ratified  Ratified  Ratified  Ratified  Ratified 
No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and the 
Protection of the Right to 
Organize 
Ratified  Not 
ratified 




No. 98 on Right to 
Organize and Collective 
Bargaining 
Ratified  Ratified  Ratified  Not 
ratified 
Ratified 
No. 100 on Equal 
Remuneration 




No. 105 on Abolition of 
Forced Labor 
Ratified  Ratified  Ratified  Ratified  Ratified 
No. 111 on Discrimination 
in Employment and 
Occupation 
Ratified  Not 
ratified 
Ratified  Ratified  Not 
ratified 








Source:  Islam (2000) 
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Prior to the crisis, Indonesia hardly had formal social protection programs to assist 
individuals, households, and communities in dealing with negative shocks, including labor 
market shocks.11 Similar to most other developing economies, I ndonesians had relied 
mostly on informal arrangements for their social protection. Exceptions to this are social 
security schemes mandated for employees in medium and large enterprises ( Jamsostek), 
public servants ( Taspen), the military ( Asabri), and health insurance for employees 
(Askes).
12  
Jamsostek is meant to provide social security benefits to workers in the forms of 
lump sum payments upon retirement or death, work-related injury and illnesses 
compensation, and some health insurance for workers plus spouses and up to three 
children.
13 The cost of this social security arrangement is funded from deducting 2 percent 
of workers’ wages plus a contribution from employers in the amount of equal to 3.7 
percent of wages.
14  
As events evolved during the crisis, these social security schemes were proved 
ineffective to function as social protection for the majority of the population, simply 
because they excluded most of the population, particularly the poor. Therefore, the 
response of the government to the impending s ocial impacts of the crisis was to launch the 
so-called social safety net programs in late 1998. These are a set of new, as well as, 
expanded programs widely known as the “JPS” programs, an acronym of the Indonesian 
terms for social safety net, which is Jaring Pengaman Sosial.  
One of the JPS programs is  padat karya, which means, as an adjective, ‘labor 
intensive’. This is actually not a single program but a large set of activities under the 
category of employment creation. These programs were created as a  response to the threat 
of burgeoning unemployment because of economic contraction, which had forced many 
firms to either lay off workers or shutdown completely. In accordance with the urban 
nature of the crisis, the initial geographical targets for the first round of ‘crash’ programs in 
fiscal year 1997/98 were directed to urban areas plus some rural areas, which experienced 
harvest failures.   
Following on these ‘crash’ programs, in  fiscal year  1998/99 there was a proliferation 
of  padat karya programs and  there were more than a dozen different programs, which fell 
into the ‘employment creation’ category. These can be classified into four types. First, 
some programs were a redesigning of on-going investment and infrastructure projects into 
more labor-intensive type projects and modes of contracts. Second, other programs gave 
block grants to local communities such as the  Kecamatan Development Project, Village 
Infrastructure Project, and PDM-DKE Program. These funds were directed to poorer areas, 
and had ‘menus’ for the utilization of the funds that included the possibility of public 
works with a labor creating effect. A third set were special labor-intensive works carried 
out by sectoral ministries such as the retraining of laid off workers carried out by the 
manpower ministry. A fourth type of program was a ‘food for work’ programs, typically 
launched by international donors and NGOs in the drought stricken areas.   
                                                   
11 Social protection programs include all actions that are aimed to (i) assist individuals, households, and 
communities to better manage risk, and (ii) provide support to the chronically poor (World Bank, 2000b). 
12 This is a result of the Worker Social Security Law, which was first issued in mid 1970s and then amended 
in 1992. See Agrawal (1995), McLeod (1993), Purwoko (1999). 
13 By law, every worker is entitled to receive  Jamsostek coverage. Firms, however, are allowed to waive 
participating in the health insurance scheme of  Jamsostek as long as they have an equally comprehensive or 
more superior scheme of their own.  
14 This amount does not include health insurance premium.   8
The collection of  padat karya programs were quite diverse and although specific 
programs were targeted to areas (such as the drought stricken areas), the lack of 
coordination meant there was little or no systematic geographic targeting of the set of 
programs overall. Within programs there were a variety of disagreements about desired 
characteristics  of intended participants but typically the beneficiaries were not chosen 
according to any fixed administrative criteria.  Hence, to the extent there was targeting, it 
was primarily through self-selection.  Only those who were willing to work should have 
been able to receive the benefit. This self-selection mechanism has the advantage over 
administrative criteria, allowing individuals to choose to participate or not and creates the 
possibility of being more flexible to unobserved household  shocks than administrative 
criteria.
15  
An evaluation study by Sumarto  et al. (2001) indicates that 5.6 percent of 
Indonesian households had at least one household member who participated in a  padat 
karya program during the crisis. Program coverage among the poorest 20 percent 
households is 8.3 percent, compared to 4.9 percent among non-poor households. On 
average, each participating household claimed to have spent an average of 4.5 man-days 
per month in  padat karya programs.  
 
V.  The Structure of Labor Market 
The structure  of Indonesian labor market now is quite different from the one that 
existed in the mid 1980s when Indonesia started deregulating its economy. Table 3 shows 
some summary statistics on the Indonesian labor force from 1986 to 1999. In the course of 
13 years,  the Indonesian labor force grew by 40 percent from 67.5 million in 1986 to 94.8 
million in 1999.
16 This implies an average annual labor force growth of 2.6 percent. During 
the whole period, however, the labor force participation rate was relatively steady b etween 
66 and 68 percent. This implies that the increase in the labor force size was mostly driven 
by natural growth, i.e. driven by the past population growth.  
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics of Indonesian Labor Force 
  1986  1989  1992  1994  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Labor force (million)  67.5  72.8  76.2  83.7  88.2  89.6  92.7  94.8 
Participation rate (%)  66.5  66.1  67.8  66.8  66.9  66.3  66.9  67.2 
Female (%)  39.2  39.9  39.0  38.9  38.5  38.3  38.8  38.4 
Urban (%)  21.6  23.9  28.7  31.3  33.9  35.6  36.0  38.1 
Formal sector (%)  26.7  27.6  30.7  36.1  37.9  39.1  35.4  36.9 
Unemployment rate (%)  2.7  2.8  2.8  4.4  4.9  4.7  5.5  6.4 
Source:  Sakernas 
 
Gender composition of the labor force was also relatively stable, where the 
proportion of the female labor force was relatively steady between 38 and 40 percent. On 
the other hand, there was a notable trend of urbanization in the labor force. The proportion 
of urban labor force almost doubled in the 13-year period from 21.6 percent in 1986 to 
                                                   
15 See Sumarto et al. (2000). 
16 In this paper, labor force is defined as population 15 year old and older who are working or looking for 
work. Before 1998, the official labor force statistics used population 10 year o ld as the threshold age. The 
change in threshold age was made in accordance with the adoption of the core ILO convention no. 138 on 
minimum age, which stipulates that the minimum age for employment is beyond basic education. Indonesia 
adopts a nine-year basic education policy.  9
38.1 percent in 1999. Similarly, there was a clear trend of formalization of the Indonesian 
economy, at least between 1986 and 1997 period where the proportion of the formal work 
force increased from 26.7 percent to 39.1 percent.17 There is an indication that the crisis 
has reversed this trend, where in 1998 the proportion of the formal work force fell back to 
35.4 percent. In 1999, however, the proportion of the formal work force has increased 
again to 36.9 percent. 
Interestingly, the unemployment rate has tended to increase, both during the pre-
crisis, as well as during the crisis periods. In the earlier period, the unemployment rate 
increased from 4.4 percent in 1994 to 4.9 percent in 1996, while in the latter period it 
increased from 4.7 percent in 1997 to 6.4 percent in 1999.18 There is a strong possibility 
that the increase in the unemployment rate in the latter period was an impact of the crisis, 
as between 1996 and 1997 the increase in unemployment rate has actually leveled off. 
However, the earlier increase was more likely to be caused by the increasing level of the 
reservation wage. Economic growth and improvement in living standard has caused more 
people to be able to afford to refuse accepting the prevailing market wage rate and choose 
to be unemployed. 
In addition to the quantity, the (formal) qualification of the Indonesian labor force 
has also changed quite considerably. Table 4 shows the structure of the labor force by 
education level. In this table, those with upper secondary and higher education levels are 
classified as the skilled labor force, while those with lower secondary and less education 
levels are classified as the unskilled labor force.
19 Using this definition, the proportion of 
the skilled labor force has continuously increased from 10.6 percent in 1986 to 23.7 
percent in 1999. This is due to increase in the proportions of both upper secondary and 
tertiary educated labor force. Consequently, the proportion of the unskilled labor force has 
decreased, which was driven mainly by decreasing proportions of the labor force with no 
schooling a nd unfinished primary, while the proportions of the labor force with primary 
and lower secondary education actually still increased.
20 
 
                                                   
17 The definition of formal work force here includes those who are: (i) self-employed and helped by non-
permanent employees, except for those in the agriculture sector, (ii) self-employed and helped by permanent 
employees, and (iii) wage employees, except for those in the agriculture sector. 
18 The unemployment rates for the period before 1994 are not strictly comparable with the rates afterward. In 
1994, the length of job search period asked in the survey was changed from the previous o ne week to the 
previous one month. 
19 In reality, skills of workers are a continuum from the least skilled to the most skilled. Furthermore, the 
formal education level is not the only determinant of skill. Other factors such as experience, on the job 
training, and innate ability play roles in skill formation. The level of formal education, however, is probably 
the most important factor and provides a good proxy for the level of skill. In addition, it has been widely used 
in other studies. In developed countries context, skilled labor is usually defined as those with tertiary 
education (see e.g. Baldwin, 1994). For the case of Indonesia, however, upper secondary education is perhaps 
a more appropriate cutting point, as in 1999 tertiary educated labor force still made up only less than 5 
percent. 
20 The increase in school graduates in Indonesia starting in the mid 1970s was due to the government’s school 
construction program. In the primary school level, for example, between 1973 and 1978 the government 
construct ed over 61,000 schools throughout the country (Duflo, 2000).  10
Table 4.  The Structure of Labor Force by Education Level (%) 
Education Level  1986  1989  1992  1994  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Unskilled labor force  89.5  87.0  84.4  82.0  78.8  77.9  77.4  76.3 
- No schooling  19.1  16.3  12.2  11.2  9.7  9.4  8.6  8.0 
- Unfinished primary  28.7  26.4  23.7  22.5  18.9  20.4  18.2  17.0 
- Primary  33.2  35.0  37.0  36.4  37.2  34.4  36.4  36.0 
- Lower secondary  8.5  9.3  11.5  11.9  13.0  13.7  14.2  15.3 
                 
Skilled labor force  10.6  13.0  15.6  18.1  21.2  22.2  22.6  23.7 
- Upper secondary  9.2  11.1  13.2  15.1  17.4  18.1  18.4  19.1 
- Tertiary  1.4  1.9  2.4  3.0  3.8  4.1  4.2  4.6 
Source:  Sakernas 
 
Economic development has brought structural transformation in the Indonesian 
economy. Table 5 shows the distribution of employment by economic sectors.
21 There was 
a redistribution of sectoral share of employment away from agriculture toward industry 
and, in particular, services sector, at l east during the growth period. Between 1986 and 
1997 the share of agriculture in employment fell from 58.9 to 40.7 percent, while those of 
industry and services increased from 8.9 to 13.9 percent and from 32.2 to 45.4 percent 
respectively. The fall in employment share of agriculture was driven primarily by the fall 
in employment share of the food crops sub-sector. 
 
                                                   
21 The sectoral disaggregation in Table 5 is dictated by the ones that are used in Sakernas. In the 1986 survey, 
there were only four sectors identified: agriculture, industry, trade, and services. Between 1989 and 1994, 
finer disaggregation of sectors increased the number of sectors to 17. These two different disaggregations are 
used to determine the sectors and sub-sectors in Table 5. Between 1996 and 1999, Sakernas used even finer 
two-digit sectoral codes.  11
Table 5.  Sectoral Distribution of Work Force (%) 
Sector  1986  1989  1992  1994  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Agriculture  58.9  55.4  52.5  45.6  43.5  40.7  45.0  43.2 
- Food crops  -  41.6  37.7  28.2  26.4  25.4  29.9  28.0 
- Estate & other crops  -  7.0  9.0  10.1  9.0  9.1  9.3  9.5 
- Livestock  -  3.3  4.5  6.2  3.4  3.1  3.2  3.1 
- Forestry, fishing & hunting  -  3.4  1.3  1.2  4.7  3.2  2.5  2.7 
                 
Industry  8.9  10.7  11.3  14.1  13.5  13.9  12.1  13.8 
- Mining and quarrying  -  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.8 
- Manufacturing  -  10.0  10.6  13.2  12.6  12.9  11.3  13.0 
• Food, beverages, & tobacco  -  2.5  2.7  3.2  3.4  3.4  2.8  3.3 
• Textile, clothing, & footwear  -  2.3  2.5  2.9  3.0  3.1  2.8  2.9 
• Wood products  -  2.0  2.0  2.8  3.1  2.7  2.8  3.0 
• Other manufacturing  -  3.3  3.4  4.3  3.1  3.7  2.9  3.9 
                 
Services  32.2  33.9  36.1  40.1  43.0  45.4  43.0  43.0 
- Trade  15.7  15.1  15.2  17.2  18.9  19.9  19.2  19.7 
- Non-Trade Services  16.5  18.8  20.9  22.9  24.1  25.5  23.8  23.3 
• Utilities  -  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2 
• Construction  -  2.6  3.4  4.4  4.5  4.9  4.0  3.9 
• Transport & communication  -  3.1  3.4  4.2  4.7  4.8  4.7  4.7 
• Finance, insurance, leasing  -  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7 
• Public service  -  5.4  5.0  4.9  4.1  3.9  4.7  4.8 
• Social  -  2.9  4.2  4.0  4.3  4.4  3.5  3.1 
• Other non-trade services  -  4.2  3.9  4.4  5.6  6.4  5.9  5.9 
Source:  Sakernas 
 
There was a temporary reversal of this trend during the crisis, where in 1998 the 
employment share of agriculture re-increased to 45 percent, while the share of industry and 
services fell back to 12.1 and 43 percent respectively. In the following year, the long-term 
trend of sectoral employment share, which is decreasing in agriculture and increasing in 
industry and services has  already returned. The employment share of agriculture, industry, 
and services sectors in 1999 is 43.2, 13.8, and 43 percent respectively. 
 
VI.  Impact of International Economic Integration on Labor Market 
This section analyzes the relationship between Indonesia’s integration with the 
world economy and changes in its labor market. The first sub-section reviews the stylized 
facts of output and labor market changes in Indonesia since the mid 1980s and their 
possible relationship with changes in trade orientation. The second sub-section examines 
the relationship between changes in skill premium and return to education with trade 
policy more formally using an econometric approach. The fourth sub-section discusses the 
role played by technology in labor market changes. 
 
VI.1.  Output and Labor Market Responses 
This sub-section analyzes empirically changes in the Indonesian labor market from 
1986 to 1999. This period can be broadly divided into three sub-periods. First, from 1986 
to 1989 as the structural adjustment  period following the changes in Indonesia’s 
development strategy from import substitution to export orientation in the mid 1980s.  12
Second, from 1989 to 1997 as the high growth period as a result of successful structural 
adjustment in the previous period. Third, from 1997 to 1999 as the crisis period which 
revealed vulnerability of a seemingly fundamentally sound Indonesian economy. 
Figures 1 to 4 show the changes in output, employment, and wages from 1986 to 
1999 in the agriculture, industrial, trade, and services sectors consecutively.
22 Both 
changes in employment and wages are disaggregated by skilled and unskilled workers. The 
figures indicate that during the structural adjustment and high growth periods, the 
industrial, trade, and services sectors have grown at about the same pace, where their 
output indexes grew from 100 in 1986 to around 230 in 1997. This implies an average 
growth of 7.9 percent annually. The output index of agriculture sector, meanwhile, only 
grew from 100 to 136 during the same period,  which implies an average growth of 2.8 
percent annually.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Output, Employment, and Wage Responses in Agriculture Sector 
 
 
                                                   
22 Different from Table 5, now the services sector is disaggregated into trade and (non-trade) services sectors. 
The trade sector includes ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ trade, and also ‘hotels and restaurants’ sub-sector. 






























































Figure 4.  Output, Employment, and Wage Responses in Services Sector 
 
During the crisis period, however, the agriculture sector fared much better than the 
other sectors. In 1998, when output shrank from the level in the previous y ear by 
unprecedented magnitudes of 9.2 percent in the industrial sector, 18 percent in the trade 
sector, and 19.6 percent in the services sector respectively, the output of the agriculture 
sector only slightly fell by 0.7 percent. In the following year, the agriculture sector led the 
recovery by growing positively at 2.1 percent, helped by the industrial sector, which grew 
by 1.4 percent. Meanwhile, the trade and services sectors in 1999 were still in negative 
growth territory of 0.4 and 1.5 percent respectively. 
During the whole period, employment growth of skilled workers in all sectors has 
been much faster than that of unskilled workers. Nevertheless, during the structural 
adjustment and high growth periods both skilled and unskilled workers have gained f rom 
positive employment growth in all sectors, except in agriculture where unskilled 
employment has continuously declined. This means that during these periods demand for 
both types of workers in the economy had grown, absorbing at least a part of the growing 
supply of labor as indicated by the labor force growth in Table 3.  
The higher growth of skilled workers employment compared to unskilled workers 
was in line with the increasing relative supply of skilled workers as indicated by Table 4. 
Figure 5 shows the indexes of the skilled and unskilled labor supply in Indonesia. The 
figure indicates that the supply of skilled workers has grown much faster than that of 
unskilled workers.
23 The number of skilled workers in 1999 is about 3.2 times the number 
in 1986. Meanwhile, the number of unskilled workers only increased by 1.2 times during 
                                                   
23 Investment in education might be endogenous to trade liberalization. For example, an increase in demand 
for skill due to trade liberalization can induce more investment in  education. In Indonesia, however, the 
government has played a crucial role in the expansion of the education sector through school construction 
program. The program was started in early 1970s, long before trade liberalization, and it was financed mainly 


















the same period. Furthermore, the number of unskilled workers toward the end of the 




Figure 5.  Supply of Skilled and Unskilled Workers 
 
During the crisis, there was a reallocation of unskilled workers from industrial, 
trade, and services sectors to agriculture, reversing the trends in the previous period. 
Skilled workers, meanwhile, faced employment opportunity shrinkage only in the 
industrial sector. Perhaps unexpectedly, the trade, services, and agriculture sectors 
continued to expand their employment of skilled workers. 
In contrast to the employment trends, there was a tendency f or real wages of 
unskilled workers to grow faster than those of skilled workers, but this was most apparent 
in the agriculture sector. In this sector, the real wages of unskilled workers in 1997 were 56 
percent higher than those prevailed in 1986. On the o ther hand, the real wages of skilled 
workers in 1997 were in fact 5 percent lower than in 1986. The implication of this is a 
declining trend in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in this sector. 
Similar wage trends were also observed in the other sectors, albeit less strong than 
those that occurred in the agriculture sector. In the industrial sector, the real wages of 
unskilled workers in 1997 were 41 percent higher than in 1986, while the real wages of 
skilled workers were only 5 percent h igher, implying also decreasing wage inequality in 
this sector.
24 During the structural adjustment period, however, skilled wages actually grew 
faster than unskilled wages, but this was only for a short period and soon afterward the 
                                                   
24 The significant increase in unskilled wages might have been partially enhanced by the end of dual “Lewis” 
labor market in Indonesia (Manning, 1995). In a dual labor market, unskilled labor in the modern sector has a 
perfectly elastic supply due to a very large pool of unskilled labor in the traditional sector ready to enter the 
modern sector (Lewis, 1954). Hence, in a dual labor market an increase in demand for unskilled labor, for 
instance due to trade liberalization, will result in an increase in employment but no change in the wages of 
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trends reversed. This confirms Suryahadi  et al. (1999) that there was an increase in wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the manufacturing sector during the 
second half of the 1980s. The reason for this is that, due to economic deregulation in the 
mid 1980s, the relative demand for skilled workers in the manufacturing sector during this 
period has sharply accelerated, albeit only temporarily and the supply effect caught up 
quickly.
25  
In the trade and services sectors, the growth of unskilled wages was consistently 
slightly higher than skilled wages growth, but the wages growth itself was not as high as 
those achieved in the agriculture and industrial sectors. During the crisis, both skilled and 
unskilled workers suffered from declining real wages in all sectors.26 By 1999, however, 
their real wages was already on the path to recovery. 
 
VI.2.  Changes in Skill Premium and Return to Education 
The previous sub-section indicates the tendency for unskilled wages to have grown 
faster than skilled wages, implying a declining trend in skill premium. These results, 
however, are drawn from comparing uncontrolled means of wages. In this subsection, the 
changes in skill premium are verified using wage regressions of the following model: 
 
e l g b a + + + + = i i i i Z X S w   ln             (1) 
 
Where  w denotes wage per hour, S is a dummy variable of skilled worker, X is a vector of 
worker characteristics (gender, experience, and experience squared), and Z is a vector of 
control variables (province, urban-rural areas, and sector of occupation). Education level is 
not included in the worker characteristic variables as it is already captured by the skilled 
worker variable. 
The regressions are run on data of workers in all sectors as well as in each sector 
for each year. The primary interest of these regressions is on the  b parameter, which is the 
skill premium. The results are summarized in Figure 6. 
 
                                                   
25 See Suryahadi (1999). 
26 It is argued that this large decline in real wages reflects the relatively flexible nature of the Indonesian 
labor market and has p revented the unemployment rate from increasing much more significantly. See 
Feridhanusetyawan (1999), Manning (2000), Skoufias and Suryahadi (1999).  17
 
Figure 6.  Skill Premium Trends 
 
The results for all sectors indicate that skill premium has indeed continuously 
declined before the crisis. It fell from 86 percent in 1986 to around 75 percent in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and to around 70 percent by the mid 1990s. During the crisis, the 
skill premium slightly increased, but has returned to the pre-crisis level by 1999.  
In general, similar trend in skill premium, with some variations, can also be 
observed in each sector. In the agriculture sector, the skill premium dropped sharply during 
the adjustment period from 72 percent in 1986 to 38 percent in 1989. During the high 
growth period, however, there was a temporary sharp increase to 50 percent in 1994. In the 
industrial sector, the skill premium did not fall during the structural adjustment period. It 
did fall, however, during the high growth period from 57 percent in 1989 to 44 percent in 
1997.  
The trade sector shows a different trend in skill premium. During the high growth 
period, it increased markedly from 50 percent in 1989 to 63 percent in 1994. On the other 
hand, the skill premium in this sector did not increase during the crisis. The services sector 
has the highest skill premium compared to other sectors. The skill premium in this sector 
was 94 percent in 1986, which then fell to 81 percent by 1997, but since then has increased 
again during the crisis to reach 86 percent in 1999. 
In the model represented by equation (1), the skill premium can also be interpreted 
as the rate of return to education at a very aggregated level, i.e. the percentage increase in 
wages of those with upper secondary education or higher compared to those with less than 
upper secondary education. To examine the changes in return to education at a more 
disaggregated level, the variable S in equation (1) now represents a vector of education 
dummy variables. The model is then run for the whole sector and the results are 





































Figure 7.  Rate of Return to Education Trends 
 
Each line in Figure 7 represents the percentage increase in wages of those with the 
respective education level compared to those with no schooling. The figure indicates that 
from the mid 1980s to early 1990s, the rates of return to all levels of education 
continuously declined. In the subsequent period, the rates of return to unfinished and 
finished primary education were relatively constant, while the rates of return to secondary 
and tertiary education continued to decline. This means that these findings from 
disaggregated return to education are consistent with the finding of declining trend in skill 
premium in Figure 6.  
Furthermore, Figure 7 gives some indication on the role of minimum wage policy 
in the declining wage inequality. After the introduction of the minimum wage policy in the 
1990s, the curves for those with unfinished primary and completed primary education are 
relatively flat, while the curves for those with tertiary and upper s econdary education are 
continuously declining. This indicates that declining skill premium has been more 
important than minimum wages on reducing wage inequality in Indonesia.  
 
VI.3.  The Role of Technology 
The role of technology in affecting changes in I ndonesian labor market was 
investigated by Suryahadi  et al. (1999). To measure technological change, they adopt two 
indirect indicators of technological change.  The first is the proportion of an industry’s 
capital stock that is “new” (defined as less than 5 years old) and the second is the extent of 
foreign participation, as measured by the proportion of firms in manufacturing that are 
foreign owned and by their proportion of manufacturing output. These are based on two 
assumptions. First, most new technologies are foreign sourced and embodied in imported 
capital.
27 Second, foreign investment, which is primarily trade in entrepreneurship and 
                                                   
27 The role of new investments in the diffusion and adaptation of new technologies is emphasized, for 



































ideas, tends to be associated with technical advances whether or not it brings with it 
imported physical capital.
28 
They find that the proportion of new capital was relatively stable at around three 
percent of the total capital stock during the late 1970s.  During the 1980s, however, there 
was a substantial acceleration in new capital from around two percent of the total c apital 
stock in 1987 to 10 percent in 1991.  Meanwhile, the trend in foreign participation up to 
the mid 1980s was decreasing. Since then it has been increasing, reflecting the more liberal 
policy on foreign ownership in this period. The results of their a nalysis show that the faster 
the rate of accumulation, and hence the larger is the proportion of new capital stock, the 
greater is the relative demand for skilled labor. For foreign investment, meanwhile, they 
find that most of it took place in lower technology industries with a significant effect on 
increasing the relative demand for unskilled labor. They argue that, after the mid 1980s, 
most foreign investors came to Indonesia seeking to exploit the country’s comparative 
advantage in unskilled labor-intensive goods. 
 
VII.  Conclusion and Implication 
The role of international economic integration on labor market changes in 
developing countries is a controversial yet not well-researched subject. Part of the reason is 
probably because it is very difficult to  establish the counterfactual, i.e. what would have 
happened had a particular country avoided international economic integration. Theoretical 
prediction based on the simple two-country two-good two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model is that international economic integration will benefit unskilled labor in 
developing countries. 
For the case of Indonesia, the HOS prediction is still observed despite continuously 
growing labor supply, which is a violation to one of the HOS assumptions. International 
economic integration has been associated with strong growth of outputs in the industrial, 
trade, and services sector. As a result, these sectors have expanded their employment of 
both skilled and unskilled workers. The agriculture sector, meanwhile, has had lower 
output growth compared to other sectors. Employment of unskilled workers in this sector 
has tended to slightly decrease over time. Its employment of skilled workers, however, has 
grown fast. 
This implies that what has happened was not strictly a reallocation of unskilled 
labor from agriculture to industrial sector and  vice versa skilled labor from industrial to 
agriculture sector. Rather, the economy has had to cope with growing supply of both 
skilled and unskilled labor. Growing output associated with international economic 
integration has made it possible for the economy to expand employment opportunities for 
both skilled and unskilled labor. The faster growth of skilled labor supply has dictated a 
growing relative employment of skilled labor in all sectors. 
Real wages have also in general increased. In particular, the growth of unskilled 
wages has been significantly faster than skilled wages growth. The growth of skilled wages 
has been more fluctuative, including negative growth during some periods in some sectors. 
As a result of this wage growth differential, relative wage of unskilled labor has tended to 
increase, implying a decrease in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. This 
is confirmed by the long term declining trend in skill premium. 
Declining wage inequality is consistent with the HOS prediction on the effect of 
increasing international economic integration. However, it is also consistent with 
                                                   
28 Ruffin (1993), for example, finds that countries, which are recipients of foreign direct investment, tend to 
have higher rates of technological change.  20
increasing relative supply of skilled labor. Hence, it is possible that the effects of b oth 
factors on reducing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor have reinforced 
each other. Nevertheless, it is also still possible that increasing international economic 
integration has put pressure on increasing wage inequality but this tendency has been 
overwhelmed by the increase in relative supply of skilled workers.
29 
The economic crisis has disrupted some of the long-term trends in the labor market. 
However, if the latest data provides an accurate indication, the disruption is only for a short 
period of time. The long-term trends of increasing relative employment and decreasing 
relative wage of skilled labor are likely to continue soon. 
The most important implication from this study is that economic growth is a 
necessary condition for improvement in labor market conditions. The recent experience of 
Indonesia is very illuminating. During the high growth period, employment and real wages 
of both skilled and unskilled labor increased.
30 On the other hand, during the crisis period, 
employment and real wages fell. 
However, relying on economic growth alone to improve the fate of workers is 
clearly insufficient. As the crisis experience has shown, there is a need to create 
mechanisms that provide protection for workers from labor market risks, such a s 
unemployment and work injury. In addition, increasing urbanization and formalization of 
the economy, declining birth rate, and increasing life expectancy, all has the effect of 
weakening the informal social protection system.  
Creating more formal mechanisms, however, is not easy, as they need to be 
balanced so as not to impinge on labor market flexibility. Simply importing labor 
protection mechanisms from developed countries is implausible due to objective conditions 
of the Indonesian labor market. Economically, ‘unemployment insurance’ is impossible 
when the informal sector dominates the labor market and ‘social security’ is impossible 
when a record of earnings for most workers cannot be made. The excluded majority will be 
simply too large to make such mechanisms an effective protection for most workers.  
In addition, a traditional social security system  ￿ a ‘pay as you go’ system that 
depends on current tax obligations to fund pension liabilities for currently retiring workers 
in the formal sector  ￿ is u sually a bad  idea as a poverty instrument in developing 
countries, even though it may be a good idea as a poverty instrument in developed 
countries. In most developed countries, historically, social security schemes were 
introduced first for formal sector  workers, as only they can be effectively taxed and have 
earnings recorded. Then later developments reveal that these schemes are under funded, 
forcing payments to be supplemented from general revenues, not only from accumulated 
savings. Hence, the schemes  became a transfer from the poor, who pay indirect taxes, to 
the rich.  
Indonesia can only gradually move to a formal social security system. Like the 
historical trend in developed countries, it can start from formal sector workers. However, it 
is important to avoid mistakes made in other countries. There should be a clear provision 
that prohibits the system from becoming a transfer mechanism from the poor to the rich. 
                                                   
29 Even if trade liberalization does increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor, the resulting 
economic growth still makes trade liberalization an effective instrument to reduce poverty. In the case of 
Indonesia, the official headcount poverty rate during the trade liberalization period decreased from 21.6 
percent in 1984 to 11.3 percent in 1996, a decrease of over 10 percentage points in a 12 year period.  
30 It is important to point out that much of the period after trade liberalization coincided with a period of 
macroeconomic stability in Indonesia. This might have  helped in shaping a favorable impact of trade 
liberalization on the labor market.   21
Given the current structure of the economy, it will still take a long time before it 
will  be economically feasible for a formal social security system to act as a universal social 
safety net in Indonesia. In the meantime, rougher measures need to be put in place in order 
to provide protection for the excluded majority of workers. This will require the 
maintenance of some crisis social safety net programs currently in place, particularly the 
employment creation and open menu social fund programs, but at a much smaller scale. 
The purpose is to be able expand such protection programs when the need  for doing so 
arises. 
One important research question that needs to be resolved is separating the effects 
of international economic integration and increasing relative supply of skilled labor on the 
observed increasing relative employment of skilled labor a nd decreasing wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled labor. Knowing the effect’s direction and magnitude of each 
factor will be useful, as it will give a more precise estimate on how international economic 
integration affects the labor market in Indonesia. In order to do this, the relative demand 
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